Segmentation or compartmentalization of a computer network is a commonly used defensive mitigation against cyber attack. Its goal is to limit the damage an attacker can cause by partitioning a network into sections or enclaves and restricting communications between them. While this technique is widely advocated as critical to the security of a network, no clear guidance currently exists on how to appropriately implement it. Additionally, the cost of testing candidate segmentation architectures on a live network or a cyber test environment is prohibitively expensive. This study examines an alternative method for evaluating segmentation architectures utilizing a continuous-time Markov chain to model changes in network state based on relevant network parameters such as vulnerability arrival rate, patch rate, etc. The model is realized by an event-based network simulation and demonstrated via a case study that evaluates a range of candidate architectures.
INTRODUCTION
Network segmentation is a security risk mitigation technique whose purpose is to limit the damage that a cyber attacker can cause upon penetrating a computer network. It executes this purpose by partitioning the network into multiple segments (e.g. by separating a network into multiple subnets or enclaves) and restricting communications allowed between these segments and between segments and the Internet. This mitigation has been recommended by several agencies, both governmental and commercial (Google, Inc. 2012 , Information Assurance Directorate @ NSA 2013 , Microsoft, Inc. 2015 , CI Security 2015 .
While there is general agreement within the security community as to the importance of segmentation as a defensive mitigation, there is no clear guidance on how to appropriately implement it. Current standards and best practices, for example as given in (Information Assurance Directorate @ NSA 2013, Reichenberg 2014), offer only non-specific suggestions and testing candidate segmentation architectures in either a live network or a cyber test environment is prohibitively expensive. Thus, practitioners are forced to use their judgment to evaluate candidate segmentation architectures and decide which one is best for their network.
We first addressed this evaluation problem in a previous study (Wagner et al. 2016a ). Here, we utilized a testbed environment together with a hierarchical simulation model to measure the security and mission impact inherent to a given segmentation architecture. The testbed environment was used to evaluate a partitioned network's security risk at the segment level in which communications between network segments and between segments and the Internet are executed via software services running on individual segments, which in turn can be exploited by cyber attacks. However, as discussed in the study, the relatively high resource cost of performing such evaluations on the testbed makes it impractical for wide-scale use.
The goal of this study is to provide a low-cost alternative to the testbed environment of our previous work. Specifically, we propose a simulation model to evaluate candidate segmentation architectures for security risk. The model employs a continuous-time Markov chain (Norris 1998) to capture changes in network state due to the arrival of new software vulnerabilities, patches, and exploits, and periodic cleansing of network segments by a cyber defender. The model is implemented via an event-based simulation and demonstrated by using it to evaluate a range of candidate segmentation architectures for a representative network environment. To the best of our knowledge, no other work has attempted to model and simulate the network segmentation mitigation. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes network segmentation and its use as a defensive mitigation and details the proposed Markov chain model, Section 3 explains the process by which model parameters are specified from real vulnerability, patching, and exploit data, Section 4 discusses experiments conducted to evaluate various candidate segmentation architectures, and Section 5 concludes.
NETWORK SEGMENTATION MODEL
Network segmentation is concerned with partitioning a network into segments and controlling communications between segments and between segments and the Internet (where we assume cyber attackers preside). The goal is to protect network resources by restricting communications which, in turn, has several beneficial security effects including: (i) reducing the number of entry points into a network, (ii) limiting the network access of an attacker who has penetrated the network, (iii) hindering the attacker's ability to move to other network devices and (iv) increasing the defender's ability to detect and remediate cyber intrusions (NSA IAD 2013) . Segmentation is typically implemented by firewalls, network egress and ingress filters, applicationlevel filters, and/or physical (hardware) infrastructure (Gezelter 1995) . For the remainder of this paper, we will refer to an individual segment of a partitioned network as an enclave, that is a group of network devices with homogeneous reachability.
Our goal is to develop a method to evaluate candidate network segmentation architectures that is relatively less resource-intensive than testing such architectures on a live network or in a cyber test environment. To this end we utilize a continuous-time Markov chain model and a corresponding simulation to capture the state of a network with respect to software vulnerabilities, patches, and exploits and the communications allowed within a given segmentation architecture. Recall that a segmentation architecture specifies one or more network enclaves and the communications allowed between these enclaves and between enclaves and the Internet. The overarching purpose of the model is to characterize the security risk to a computer network from attackers external to the network who attempt to penetrate a network enclave and then pivot and spread to other enclaves by compromising allowed communication pathways between enclaves. Below we describe the cyber entities captured within the model, their corresponding state variables/attributes and assumptions, and an event-based network simulation that implements the model.
Markov Process State Transitions
In our Markov chain model (introduced in (Riordan et al. 2016 )), we model the arrival of security events (e.g. vulnerabilities, exploits, patches, etc.) on the network as following Poisson processes (Kingman 1992) , and thus transitions between states are characterized by sampling rates in which intervals between event samples are assumed to be exponentially distributed with a given mean. Poisson processes have often been used to model users arriving to perform tasks of different durations such as given in (Cox and Isham 1980) . We use Poisson processes to capture attackers arriving to exploit insecure conditions, defenders arriving to remediate such conditions, and network users falling into traps set by attackers such as browsing to malicious web sites or executing malicious email attachments and subsequently causing compromises as used in (Lippmann et al. 2012) . For the remainder of this paper, we refer to sampling rates used for state transitions as simply Poisson rates.
Network Environment
A network environment is modeled in which there exists a communications topology, that is a set of enclaves and communication pathways that connect these enclaves.
Here, communication pathways between enclaves do not represent physical connections, but rather functional information flows (FIFs). FIF refers to any communication pathway between two enclaves and includes pathways in which the source and destination are directly connected (by a physical line), transitive communication pathways (e.g. a server enclave being able to communicate with the Internet despite the fact that no direct line between these two enclaves exist), and more complex information flows (e.g. an email is sent from the Internet enclave that arrives at a DMZ enclave, is pulled by an email server to a server enclave, and is finally downloaded and read by a user account in the LAN enclave). For complex information flows, such as the email information flow just described, it is important to note that an attack coming from a particular source enclave (such as the Internet) may eventually compromise the destination enclave (in this example the LAN enclave) without compromising any of the intermediate enclaves between these two enclaves (in this example intermediate enclaves include the DMZ and server enclaves).
For the purposes of our model, FIF is modeled only as a communication pathway from the source enclave to the destination enclave. Intermediate enclaves between the source and destination are not modeled. Note that the Internet is also modeled as a single enclave which is always compromised.
Enclave
An enclave, i.e. a group of network devices with homogeneous reachability, is connected to other enclaves via FIFs as described above. A connection from a source enclave to a destination enclave is made through one or more software services running on the destination enclave. For example, a destination enclave may run a software service allowing a source to communicate with it via the SSH protocol (Ylonen 2016) .
We assume that an enclave E becomes compromised when a service running on E has had an exploit event arrive on the service and FIF connects an already compromised enclave E comp to E via this service (exploit events on services are described in the following section). We also assume that there exists a process to cleanse an enclave, i.e., disentrench an ensconced attacker from the enclave via malware tools, re-imaging, or other similar measures.
An enclave is characterized by the following state variables: (i) the set of services running on the enclave, (ii) a flag that signals whether or not the enclave is compromised and (iii) the average rate for cleansing the
clean . The cleansing process for each enclave is assumed to be independent, and thus cleansing events are not synchronized over multiple enclaves. Note that a cleansing event for a given enclave is modeled as arriving at any time and is not correlated to whether or not the enclave is compromised. This captures cleansing events that may take place due to hardware or software upgrades on the network as well as those triggered by compromise detection. As discussed in Section 2.1, we model the arrival of security events on the network as Poisson processes, and thus enclave cleansing, ∆ clean represents a Poisson rate for transition from a compromised state to a clean state and ∆ −1 comp is a Poisson rate for transition from a clean state to a compromised state.
The enclave cleansing rate, ∆ −1 clean , is a directly-specified parameter for an enclave E while the compromise rate, ∆ −1 comp , is specified as a function of the Markov processes governing the states of one or more services running on E. Services running on an enclave are independent and ∆ −1 comp , thus, can be calculated as:
where s i represents i th service, i ∈ [1, N], running on a given enclave E, N is the total number of available services on E and ∆ −1 comp (s i ) is the compromise rate of service s i .
Service
A service s is defined as a software package that allows communication between enclaves and may be exploited by an attacker. For example, an enclave may run a service such as HTTPD (The Apache Software Foundation 2016) or RPCD (Birrell and Nelson 1994) and permit another enclave to initiate communications with it via this service. Services such as these have software vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an attacker to enable her to spread from one enclave to another.
We assume that s may have zero or more vulnerabilities depending on whether or not it has been patched/updated recently. We characterize s as being in one of three possible states: (i) Patched: s has zero vulnerabilities, (ii) Vulnerable: s has one or more unpatched vulnerabilities, and (iii) Exploit Developed: attackers have developed an exploit that may be used to compromise an existing vulnerability of s.
A continuous-time Markov chain is used to model the state of a service over time in which transitions between states are specified as Poisson rates. This Markov process is shown in Figure 2 . From the figure, a service s initially has zero vulnerabilities (shown as the 0 Vulnerabilities state in the figure) and new vulnerabilities (e.g., states 1 Vulnerability and 2 Vulnerabilities) for s arrive/become known an average rate of ∆ 
Figure 2: The Markov process states represent how many vulnerabilities are present for a service s and whether an exploit for any of the vulnerabilities has been developed for s since the last patch.
(i.e., it is multiplied by the number of vulnerabilities present). When an exploit is developed for any existing vulnerability, the Markov process transitions the service to the Exploit Developed state. Once there, s can incur exploits which allow an attacker to compromise it and penetrate the enclave on which it is running. Exploit events arrive at an average rate of ∆ −1
exploit . Finally, patch events, in which a service is restored to its initial state (zero vulnerabilities) arrive at an average rate of ∆ −1 patch . As discussed in Section 2.3, the enclave compromise rate, specified by Eq. 1, is given as the sum of the compromise rates of the services running on the enclave. The compromise rate for a single service is thus characterized by the Markov process described above (and depicted in Figure 2 ).
Event-based Network Simulation
Given a complete network segmentation architecture including all enclaves and their associated services and a communications topology specifying communication pathways between enclaves and between enclaves and the Internet, it is not tractable to compute, in closed form, the inherent security risk. Therefore, an event-based simulation is implemented to compute this risk. The simulation is intended to compute, given a network segmentation architecture and for each enclave within that architecture, the expected probability that the enclave is compromised at any moment. The simulation is implemented using a combination of Scala (Odersky et al. 2004) and Python (Rossum et al. 1991) .
A simulation run is executed as follows: (1) All model entities (i.e., network enclaves, their services, the communications topology including the Internet) are instantiated and all state variables for each entity are specified. All enclaves are initially uncompromised and services running on enclaves have no vulnerabilities present. (2) Events are generated by the Poisson processes specified for each network entity (e.g., arrivals of vulnerabilities on services, exploits developed for these vulnerabilities, etc.). (3) A run is terminated when it reaches a specified maximum number of simulated time units. In general, a run is executed for a sufficiently large number of simulated time units such that the expected probability of compromise for each enclave has reached a steady state, that is it remains unchanged. (4) Upon run completion the expected probabilities of compromise for each network enclave can be aggregated (e.g. averaged) to compute a single measure of security risk for the network as a whole.
As discussed in Section 2, the Markov model requires that Poisson rate parameters governing the behavior of enclaves and their corresponding software services be specified. Each service requires specification of multiple rate parameters including (i) vulnerability arrival rate (∆ cleanse ). In Section 4 we examine a range of enclave cleansing rates and provide a discussion of those settings there. With respect to software services, our goal is to characterize a representative service by computing realistic rates from actual security data for the aforementioned service parameters. Here, we summarize the process for computing these rates.
We utilize the National Vulnerability Database (NVD 2016) together with results from large-scale vulnerability studies provided by (Nappa et al. 2015) , (Frei et al. 2006) , (Frei 2009 ) and (Frei et al. 2010) . These studies define a vulnerability lifecycle in which points in time divide the vulnerability into several distinct phases that capture its state over time. We use this concept to characterize the following phases (depicted in Figure 3 ): vulnerability disclosure (when the vulnerability becomes known), exploit development (when an exploit for the vulnerability is developed), exploit deployment/occurrence (when the exploit is utilized), and vulnerability patch (when a patch for the vulnerability becomes available). Time dependencies between phases are given in Figure 3 . From the figure, vulnerability disclosure kicks off two processes in parallel: exploit development and patch arrival. Once an exploit has been developed for the vulnerability (and before a patch has arrived), exploits that may result in compromises can now occur (be deployed) for that service. Patch arrival closes the vulnerability's lifecycle by making its exploit(s) ineffective. We use data collected with respect to these phases to compute rates for our representative service. vuln : To characterize the vulnerability arrival rate of a representative service, we average the most common services given in (Frei et al. 2010 ) as shown below:
where i represents the most vulnerable application for a vendor from the top vendor list derived by (Frei et al. 2010 ). V i is the weighted sum of vulnerabilities for application i over time period T where weights are given by each vulnerability's severity score (CVSS 2015) score. N is a set containing the most vulnerable applications from top vendor list derived by (Frei et al. 2010 ) which collects vulnerability data over a 7-year period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) and groups them by vendors (e.g., vulnerabilities for Microsoft products, for Adobe products, etc.). Note that Eq. 2 considers the set of all known vulnerabilities for a given software service s over a given time period, T . Based on our computation, the average service vulnerability arrival rate is approximately 1 every 65 days.
patch : (Frei et al. 2006 ) analyzes data on nearly 15K vulnerabilities over a 5-year period (from 2001 to 2006), derives vulnerability discovery dates and patch availability dates from publicly available resources, and finally splits the collected vulnerabilities into two data sets: vulnerabilities discovered (i) before being publicly disclosed and (ii) on the day of disclosure. Authors claim that patch availability before disclosure and on disclosure fit to Pareto and Weibull distributions, respectively. In order to integrate these results for our network segmentation model, we fit each result to a Poisson distribution and then compute a weighted average of these fitted results. Based on our computation, the average service patch arrival rate is approximately 1 every 25 days (after vulnerability disclosure).
∆ −1
dev : (Frei et al. 2006 ) executes a similar process to derive exploit availability (exploit development) dates. This study yields exploit development rates ranging from ≈ 8 days before disclosure to ≈ 2 days after disclosure. Additionally, (Frei et al. 2010) reports that for ≈ 90% of vulnerabilities collected, exploits are available within 10 days of their corresponding disclosure dates. Here, we use an approximated mid-point of these two studies: exploit development occurs 5 days after vulnerability disclosure, on average.
exploit : The exploit occurrence rate is generally dependent on the perceived value of the target network and on the aggressiveness of an attacker. Less aggressive attackers may prefer waiting some time before using an available exploit on a vulnerable service and/or may attack infrequently. More aggressive attackers attack frequently and may not wait before using an available exploit. As a result, we examine a range of attacker aggressiveness levels: ∆ −1 exploit = 0, · · · , 5 days after exploit development.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section we demonstrate the proposed Markov chain model by using it to evaluate varying segmentation architectures for security risk. Here, we examine the three architectures depicted in Figure 4 . In the figure, green nodes represent network enclaves and red nodes represent the Internet I. Labeled arrows represent communications permitted between nodes where the labels represent software services that allow the communications (e.g. S 1 , · · · , S 10 in Figure 4a means that ten software services running on enclave E 1 allow communication with the Internet). The three segmentation architectures of Figure 4 capture varying degrees of segmentation. Sub-figure (a) represents a network with no segmentation, i.e. an entire network contained within a single enclave with communications to the Internet (where we assume the attacker presides) given via ten software services. Sub-figure (b) represents a network with three enclaves in serial where enclave E 1 allows communications with the Internet (via ten services as in sub-figure (a)) and communications between E 1 and E 2 and between E 2 and E 3 are each given by a single service (S 11 and S 12 , respectively). Finally, sub-figure (c) represents a more complex segmentation architecture with a total of seven enclaves and both serial and parallel communications allowed. Here, E 1 , E 2 , E 3 are allowed communication with the Internet via a total of ten services that are divided between each of these Internet-facing enclaves. Internal enclaves E 4 , E 5 , E 6 each communicate with one Internet-facing enclave via one distinct service (either S 11 , S 12 , or S 13 ) and the most internal enclave E 7 communicates with each of the other internal enclaves via a single, non-distinct service (S 14 ). 
Experiment Setup
Using the procedure described in Section 3, we characterize a representative software service by specifying values for four Poisson rate parameters: vulnerability arrival rate ∆ Table 1 gives the values specified for these rates. In the table, values shown represent mean rates for Poisson processes in days and rates for ∆ −1 exploit and ∆ −1 patch are specified as ranges. As described in Section 3 and shown in Figure 3 , rates for exploit development, exploit occurrence, patch arrival require other events to trigger their execution. Specifically, exploit development and patch arrival are both triggered only after a vulnerability arrives while exploit occurrence is triggered only after an exploit has been developed.
In Table 1 , the values for ∆ −1 exploit and ∆ −1 patch are given as ranges that are explored by our experiments by sweeping through the specified parameter range. For parameter ∆ −1 exploit , we explore mean Poisson rates corresponding to exploits occurring 0 days, · · · , 5 days after exploit development. For parameter ∆ −1 patch , we explore rates corresponding to patches arriving 20 days, · · · , 30 days after vulnerability arrival. Note that for our experiments each software service is modeled by the rates given in Table 1 . We also investigate a range of enclave cleansing rates (∆ −1 clean , described in Section 2). For our experiments we explore mean cleansing rates of once every month (30 days), every 2 months (60 days), 3 months (90 days), 6 months (180 days), and 1 year (365 days). We execute a single simulation run for each distinct set of parameters with termination condition of 300 simulated years (300 X 365 days) to allow enclaves to reach steady state (i.e., running for longer times will not change their output). Note that because simulations run until steady state, there is no need to execute multiple runs for a single set of parameters.
Results
Figures 5, 6, and 7 give experimental results for the three architectures of patch described in Section 4.1, where mean patch arrival varies between one in 20 days to one in 30 days (after vulnerability arrival) and mean exploit occurrence varies between one in 0 days (i.e. immediately) to one in 5 days (after exploit development). Figure 6 provides results for the same parameter settings of Figure 5 except that the mean enclave cleanse rate is set to once in 90 days. The vertical axis of these figures gives the expected probability of enclave compromise at any moment for each set of parameters. Points (black dots) in the figures represent actual simulation output while the mesh plot connecting the points is created using linear interpolation. Note that for architectures (b) and (c), the output shown is the average over the multiple enclaves of their architecture (because architecture (a) has only one enclave, it is not necessary to average). From Figures 5 and 6 , we see that architecture (a) (no segmentation) has a markedly higher probability of enclave compromise (approximately 2-4 times higher) than the other two architectures, which is expected. When comparing architectures (b) and (c), however, results may appear to be somewhat counterintuitive.
Here, architecture (b) (three enclaves in serial) performs noticeably better from a security perspective (approximately 50% lower probability of compromise) than the more complex architecture (c) even though it has fewer enclaves in total. This is due to the multiple, parallel communication pathways that the attacker can exploit when attempting to spread from one enclave to another.
In Figure 7 (a) we explore multiple settings for the mean enclave cleansing interval ∆ clean ranging from 30, · · · , 365 days for each architecture. In the figure, we examine two settings of ∆ patch that correspond to best-and worst-case scenarios for the defender. For the best-case scenario, we assume that patches arrive quickly (once in 20 days, the lowest interval in the range for ∆ −1 patch ) and that exploits occur slowly (once in 5 days, the highest interval in the range for ∆ −1 exploit ). For the worst-case scenario, we assume the opposite: patches arrive slowly (once in 30 days, the highest interval in the ∆ −1 patch range) and exploits occur quickly (once in 0 days, i.e. immediately after exploit development, the lowest interval in the ∆ −1 exploit range). Best-case scenario results are given by blue, green, and red lines and worst-case scenario results by cyan, purple, and yellow lines for the three architectures. Points (black dots) represent actual simulation output while lines connecting points are created using linear interpolation. From Figure 7 (a) we see that architecture (a) (blue and cyan lines) has significantly worse security performance than the other two architectures and that architecture (b) (green and purple lines) outperforms architecture (c) (red and yellow lines) for both best-and worst-case scenarios and all settings examined for enclave cleansing. From Figure 7 (b) we see that the probability of compromise for the most internal enclave of architecture (b) (enclave E 3 in Figure 4 (b)) shows a marked divergence from the internal-most enclave of architecture (c) (enclave E 7 in Figure 4 (c)), especially as the mean enclave cleansing interval (∆ clean in the figure) increases to 365 days. For both best-and worst-case scenarios, architecture (b) protects the internal-most enclave better than architecture (c) with up to a 60% reduction in probability of compromise (when ∆ clean = 365 days for the worst-case scenario). It is a common practice for network architects to place servers/databases in the inner-most enclave(s) of a network, and if so architecture (b) would likely protect these critical network resources better than architecture (c).
Overall, two important observations are seen from these results. First, the use of network segmentation as a mitigation against cyber attack can provide compelling improvements in security risk compared to not using it. Second, for a given network environment the optimal segmentation architecture can be difficult to determine and, potentially, counterintuitive even for seasoned security practitioners.
CONCLUSION
In this study we develop a Markov chain model and corresponding simulation to capture the security risk inherent to a given network segmentation architecture. This model provides a low-cost method for architecture evaluation and supports security practitioners by enabling them to examine multiple candidate architectures in order to find efficacious ones for their network environment. Future work is focused on incorporating this simulation model into the prototype system of our previous work (Wagner et al. 2016b) in which a decision engine was built to automatically generate an optimal segmentation architecture for a given network environment and organizational mission. In that work, we utilized the testbed environment described in (Wagner et al. 2016a ) for this purpose, and we aim to replace the testbed with the proposed simulation model to speed up evaluations performed by the system and improve its search of the space of candidate segmentation architectures.
